
Ghana’s democratic dispersion has kick-started with a constitutional character, precisely, the 1992 constitution.
This 1992 constitution has established many committees, bodies, agencies and departments that are clothed with certain constitutional powers, mandates and responsibilities to make them functional and operational.
One among such committees is the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament. PAC, as it is commonly known and called, is one of the standing committees of parliament, which is established by the constitution, specifically Article 187 of the 1992 constitution.
The balance of power is a whole accountability situation where the various arms of the government check the expenditure and the financing behaviour of the other.
In theory, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament stands as one of the most important checks on government spending.
Tasked with scrutinising public finances, auditing accounts, and holding ministries and agencies accountable, the PAC should serve as the sentinel of transparency and fiscal responsibility.
Yet, in practice, it has increasingly become a toothless body—an institution that raises alarms but rarely bites.
Despite the committee’s high-profile reports and dramatic hearings, the impact of its findings is often limited to media soundbites.
Ministries and officials implicated in financial mismanagement frequently face no serious consequences. Recommendations are delayed, diluted, or quietly ignored.
The PAC’s annual reports, though detailed, rarely translate into systemic reforms or accountability measures, leaving taxpayers to shoulder the cost of inefficiency and corruption.
Several factors contribute to the PAC’s ineffectiveness. Political considerations often overshadow the committee’s mandate. Members of Parliament, while earnest, are constrained by party loyalty and the broader political calculus.
Moreover, the committee’s lack of enforcement powers means it can only make recommendations, not impose sanctions. Without follow-up mechanisms or legal teeth, its role is largely advisory, and its influence remains symbolic.
The public perception of the PAC has suffered as a result. Citizens increasingly view it as a showpiece rather than a forceful watchdog—a body that can investigate and report, but cannot compel meaningful change.
This erosion of confidence is dangerous in a democracy, where fiscal oversight is vital to maintaining public trust in government institutions.
To restore the PAC’s relevance, structural reforms are urgently needed. This could include granting it greater enforcement authority, ensuring non-partisan appointments, and establishing mandatory follow-up procedures for its recommendations.
Transparency must be coupled with accountability; without consequences, audits and reports become exercises in futility.
The PAC is too important to remain toothless. If it fails to evolve into a body that can both scrutinise and enforce, the nation risks a cycle of unchecked expenditure, mismanagement, and declining public trust.
Parliament must act decisively to ensure that the committee meant to protect the public purse truly serves the public interest.
Constitutional Mandate and Reality
The 1992 Constitution explicitly empowers the PAC to examine government accounts and investigate financial mismanagement.
Article 187(1) states that the Auditor-General shall submit accounts of public institutions and report the same to Parliament, “which shall cause them to be examined by the Public Accounts Committee.”
Additionally, Article 187(4) mandates that the PAC report any irregularities with recommendations for corrective action.
Despite this constitutional backing, enforcement remains weak. The PAC can summon officials and request explanations, but it lacks prosecutorial power. Its recommendations must be acted upon by other arms of government or agencies, which often delays or nullifies accountability.
PAC and retrieval cases
Even though PAC seems to have failed in her role as a watchdog, it has also achieved certain remarkable achievements in her quest to retrieve some amount for the state, for instance, Ghc12.9 billion in misappropriated public funds, marking a significant claw-back of state resources.
Ghc 2,075,214.32 members recovered from five GIMPA staff members who failed to return to their posts after completing doctoral studies abroad.
Another recovery was from the office of the Head of the Civil Service for infractions highlighted in the 2024 Auditor–General’s report. Another case of recovery was Ghc1.29billion underpaid to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and independent Power Producers (IPPs) by the electricity company of Ghana under the cash waterfall Mechanism, and so many other recovery cases.
So, if PAC is granted a lot more powers of prosecutorial and the police power of arrest, it can do more in terms of recovering more money for the state.
Case Studies: When Accountability Falters
- Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFund) Audits (2017–2019)
The PAC examined irregularities in GETFund spending, highlighting missing receipts and unapproved expenditures totalling millions of cedis. Despite public hearings and detailed reports, few officials faced sanctions, and systemic reforms were minimal.
- National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) Audit (2018)
Auditor-General reports revealed delayed reimbursements and questionable procurement practices.
The PAC conducted hearings, but the government’s response was slow, leaving the financial management issues largely unresolved.
- Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) (2019–2020)
Investigations exposed mismanagement of millions in water projects. PAC recommendations for recovery and sanctions were not fully implemented, undermining public confidence in the agency’s stewardship of resources.
- Free SHS Implementation Irregularities (2021–2023)
The PAC investigated alleged misappropriation of funds in the Free Senior High School (SHS) program, including ghost beneficiaries and inflated procurement costs. While hearings were publicised, follow-up actions have been slow, with minimal enforcement.
- COVID-19 Related Fund Mismanagement (2020–2022)
Audits of funds allocated for COVID-19 relief revealed procurement irregularities, delayed disbursements, and unaccounted expenditures.
PAC hearings exposed these issues to the public, yet concrete legal or administrative actions have largely been absent.
Why the PAC Remains Ineffective
Several factors weaken the PAC’s effectiveness:
- Political Interference: Committee members are MPs bound by party allegiance, limiting impartial investigations.
These members of the PAC committee also have elections to contest, and so they may be thinking about how to win their next elections to remain in the house. Your party may cause you to lose your elections if your behaviour at the committee sitting is unfortunately classified as anti-party behaviour.
That is the chairperson of the committee must come from the opposition party. Even then, there are times when certain high-profile financial irregularity cases may be brushed aside, since such cases may expose the government in power.
- Limited Enforcement Powers: PAC cannot prosecute; it relies on other institutions to act on recommendations. PAC lacks prosecutorial powers and enforcement actions.
The Constitution’s review committee must reconsider their report on the review and incorporate this PAC-empowered issue if not already considered.
If PAC has the enforcement powers, prosecutorial powers and the power to arrest, their work can be more effective and efficient.
- Delayed Follow-ups: Reports often take years to publish, diminishing their immediate impact.
This can also demoralise the members of the PAC while emboldening the culprits of the looted finances, since they would continue to enjoy the fruits of their criminal enterprise.
The delay can also delete some of the hard-core evidence from being revealed to support the matter, in case the case is being sent to court
Reforming the PAC: A Path Forward
For the PAC to truly protect public funds, structural and procedural reforms are needed:
- Strengthen Legal Powers: Amend legislation and the constitution to grant prosecutorial powers to the PAC to enable it to do automatic prosecution, and the police power of arrest and detention to make their work more effective and efficient, just like how other corruption-fighting institutions.
- Ensure Political Independence: Expand membership across parties to reduce partisan influence. And also the PAC should have no member of parliament too in there, who are highly qualified in the fields of accounting and auditing, to enhance the professional work that they have always wanted to execute. These non-members of parliament should never have certain powers as the MPs do, as these will go a long way to strengthen the professionalism of their work and also boost the morale and the integrity of their operations of the PAC.
- Institutionalise Follow-ups: Implement mandatory reviews of PAC recommendations to ensure corrective actions are taken. The follow-up on the reports of the PAC should be mandatory, where the committee itself would ensure that its recommendations are implemented without any further delay. They will ensure that the corrective action that the committee has wanted to see operationalised is indeed manifested.
- Improve Transparency: Publicise PAC hearings and outcomes to enhance accountability. The hearings should be published at a time when the full public can see the work the Committee is doing, and to help them offer the necessary productive criticism that is needed to strengthen and better the operations of PAC. The actions taken by PAC must also be published in the print media. These actions, including the amount of money recovered, the prosecutions and even the arrest of the corrupt public officials, must be made public, and these actions will change the perceptions the public has about the work of PAC.
Conclusion
The PAC holds immense potential as a guardian of public resources, but its current structure and limitations have left it largely symbolic. From GETFund to COVID-19 relief, repeated cases demonstrate the committee’s inability to enforce accountability effectively.
Ghana cannot afford a toothless watchdog; Parliament must empower the PAC to act decisively, ensuring public funds are managed with transparency, integrity, and diligence and the prudence it deserves.
By Albert Atsu Sosu, C.A, ACIB, CFE, PhD, Financial Economics candidate


