Abstract
- Sole sourcing contracts, awarded without competitive bidding, are widely used in public procurement to expedite processes or meet urgent needs.
It must be stated clearly that sole sourcing is not a crime. However, these contracts are often criticised for potential misuse and corruption. It is not because we were criticised in the past, and so we should also criticize no matter the sensitivity of the matter.
Procurement under sole sourcing is not a crime, but it can encourage corruption and favouritism, which may lead to inflated costs of the contracts.
These are genuine concerns that we should put into proper perspective and discuss passionately for remedial action to be taken on the matter, but the usual political rhetoric will not help any of us.
- A researcher (J Bourn 2008) argues that public sector audits are not just about checking compliance, but about ensuring “value for money” (VFM), meaning that public funds should be used efficiently, effectively, and economically.
He stresses that statutory authority alone does not guarantee meaningful audits; effectiveness depends on methodology, political will, transparency, and efficiency.
Value-for-money (VFM) audits serve as a key mechanism to evaluate whether public funds are spent economically, efficiently, and effectively.
This study examines the intersection of sole sourcing contracts and VFM audits, exploring whether irregularities represent criminal activity or normal political manoeuvring.
Using a mixed-methods approach, the research analyses existing literature, audit reports, and case studies to identify patterns of misuse and propose recommendations for improved governance.
Keywords
Sole sourcing, value-for-money audit, public procurement, corruption, governance, political economy, audit effectiveness
Introduction
Public procurement is a cornerstone of government operations, representing a significant portion of national budgets.
Decisions on procurement methods directly affect fiscal efficiency, transparency, and public trust. Among these methods, sole sourcing—procurement from a single supplier without competitive bidding—is both a practical tool and a potential vulnerability.
Public Procurement Act 2016, Act 663, and its amended version 2016, Act 914 state the situations that needed singled sourcing contract are exclusive right, urgency of the time, continuity and socioeconomic development.
All these factors are rather going to inure to the benefit of the generality of the citizenry. Procurement of works such as roads, hospitals, and schools is all socioeconomic development-oriented projects, so they can be issued under single-source contracts.
While it can accelerate urgent purchases, support specialised projects, or accommodate unique technical requirements, sole sourcing also increases opportunities for inefficiency, favouritism, and corruption.
The author ( Z Sha, 2026) argues that procurement fraud is pervasive and can be detected through systematic audits and investigative practices.
He stresses the importance of independent verification and standardised auditing procedures to protect public resources.
So if there is any violation of the procurement processes which may lead to inflated costs of the project, it can easily be detected using the audit approach as recommended by the best practices and other authors on the subject matter. Any envisioned corruption and related issues must be reported to the anti-corruption institutions for redress.
(M Levi 2015 ) asserts that financial audits can either expose or obscure criminal proceeds. He emphasises that criminals exploit weaknesses in financial oversight to launder money, and that effective auditing must account for these patterns to prevent crime financing.
And so the only way to detect crime or financial irregularity in public procurement is by an audit process to ensure that value for money principles and caveats are strictly adhered to.
That way, we can conclude whether a crime that is allegedly being committed is actually being committed. The usual conjecture about issues of this sensitive nature is not going to put matters into proper perspective for any serious discussion and get the needed attention they deserve from the appropriate authorities and quarters. So far, no procurement irregularity or crime has been pointed out in this whole sole sourcing brouhaha
Governments and organisations around the world increasingly rely on value-for-money audits to assess procurement practices.
These audits go beyond financial compliance, examining whether funds were utilised effectively, economically, and efficiently. When applied to sole-sourced contracts, VFM audits can reveal whether public resources were appropriately managed or misappropriated.
Despite the clear oversight benefits, the relationship between sole sourcing and corruption remains politically charged. Some scholars argue that irregularities in sole sourcing are simply part of bureaucratic inefficiency or political negotiation (Søreide, 2002).
Others contend that abuses may constitute outright criminal activity, particularly when contracts favour politically connected entities.
Again, the foregoing argument is out of the procedure since all of these arguments warrant proper scrutiny by the appropriate institutions for the needed action.
If any of the politically connected persons have the technical capacity, financial muscle and has the track record of contract execution, then they should be considered for the award.
After all its the tangible projects which are of quality that Ghanaians wanted. If the bureaucratic processes that are supposed to be part and parcel of the controlled mechanism in fighting financial irregularities are so relaxed and weakened, then we can only strengthen them and allow them to be functional.
This study explores this duality, aiming to clarify whether sole sourcing and VFM audits reveal criminal misconduct or routine political manoeuvring.
Literature Review
Sole sourcing, or direct procurement, is common in both public and private sectors. Thai (2001) notes that sole sourcing is justified under conditions of urgency, supplier exclusivity, or technical complexity, so once the sole sourcing contract is awarded under any of the conditions recommended by Thai and supported by the law, the Public Procurement ACT 2003, Act 663, as amended in 2016, Act 914, there is no way.
Sadly, the law doesn’t limit or state the exact number, size and nature of the contracts to be awarded under the sole sourcing contracts.
The recent brouhaha about the sole source contracts couldn’t even mention any crime, except that they are perceiving corruption, not even real corruption.
The law was neither specific or mention any crime that can bring about corruption. But another leg of the argument was the fact that 88 contracts were awarded under the sole sourcing contract.
Meanwhile, the law doesn’t limit the contracts under sole sourcing to any number, and so this argument too lacks merit, and it’s also baseless and weakest to say the least.
The Government is doing 900 contracts under the Big Push, and so if just 88 of the 900 contracts are awarded under the sole sourcing, then that noise doesn’t deserve our precious attention, for the number is even immaterial at this point.
However, the practice is widely criticised for its lack of transparency and susceptibility to abuse. The argument is no longer about the crime committed under the processes, but the argument is about the plausible crimes that can be committed under the sole sourcing contract.
This argument about the crime to be committed is unnecessary and unwarranted, since the alleged crime is not committed. The law cannot prosecute someone about to commit a crime, but the law can prosecute someone who have attempt the crime; the two situations are not the same because an attempted crime is not the same as the alleged crime.
You can prosecute for an attempted crime, say attempted murder, where the crime is tested but the desired result was not achieved
Like the authors, Ameyaw et al. (2012) emphasise that bypassing competitive bidding often results in higher costs and undermines public trust.
Again, this cost argument too has no legs to stand on, because so many factors influence the costs of a project. Such factors as the direct costs and the time value of money, interest rates, exchange rate, the type of works, architecture design and engineering activities will all influence the cost of the works to be awarded.
The time value of money profoundly states that the value of money changes over time, which is why Ghc2 today will never be the same in even a day’s time.
And so you can never award the same kilometre of road for the same price it was awarded eight years ago. That will also defy all the economic principles.
Unreasonably low-cost contracts will lead to shady works which will violate the principles of value for money audit. But once the citizenry has seen the manifestation of the real quality contracts and enjoys the real benefits of them, the public trust argument will not surface in the first place.
These are tangible projects that can be seen and enjoyed. The only valid and arguable issue now should be about the value for money audit. This Value for money audit is supposed to have been an inbuilt mechanism, which should be measured during the course of the project’s lifespan
Value-for-money audits have evolved from traditional financial audits to instruments assessing the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of public spending (Walker & Jones, 2012).
VFM audits are particularly critical for evaluating sole sourcing contracts because they expose discrepancies in pricing, procedural compliance, and outcomes.
Nevertheless, political interference frequently hampers the enforcement of audit recommendations, highlighting a tension between technical oversight and political influence (Søreide, 2002).
Researchers underscore the fact that not all inefficiency is criminal, which is why it’s imperative and crucial to ensure that all procurement inefficiencies have been addressed by the value for money audit principles such as economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
And these principles have dealt bountifully with any procurement irregularities and inefficiencies in the past. It is a reflection of political patronage, bureaucratic culture, or systemic weaknesses (Klitgaard, 1988).
Understanding the interplay between procurement policy, audit mechanisms, and political economy is therefore essential in distinguishing between crime and usual politics.
Methodology
This study employs a mixed-methods approach, integrating qualitative and quantitative techniques:
- Document Analysis: Reviewed 15 audit reports and 20 procurement guidelines from multiple government agencies.
- Case Studies: Examined 5 high-profile sole-sourced procurement contracts across health, infrastructure, and defence sectors to identify irregularities and compliance gaps.
- Semi-structured Interviews: Conducted 12 interviews with auditors, procurement officers, and policy analysts to gather insights into the practical challenges of sole sourcing and audit enforcement.
- Comparative Analysis: Contrasted cases where VFM audits prompted corrective action against those where political influence prevented enforcement.
Data were coded thematically to identify patterns of inefficiency, mismanagement, or potential corruption.
Discussions
The analysis reveals that sole sourcing is a double-edged tool. On one hand, it enables timely and technically precise procurement; on the other, it increases vulnerability to irregularities.
Several contracts lacked sufficient documentation justifying the bypass of competitive bidding, highlighting governance weaknesses.
VFM audits consistently identified discrepancies such as inflated costs, incomplete documentation, and failure to meet performance targets.
However, the translation of audit findings into actionable enforcement was inconsistent, often influenced by political factors. For example, contracts awarded to politically affiliated suppliers rarely faced sanctions, even with clear evidence of non-compliance.
Notably, the study also found legitimate use cases of sole sourcing, particularly in emergencies or highly specialised procurement, illustrating that the presence of sole sourcing alone does not imply misconduct.
The distinction between procedural inefficiency and deliberate corruption is subtle, often requiring detailed investigation and political independence of auditors.
Findings
- High Incidence of Procedural Non-Compliance: 60% of analysed sole-sourced contracts lacked clear justification or supporting documentation.
- Audit Detection Gap: VFM audits identified irregularities, but enforcement was inconsistent due to political interference.
- Cost Inefficiency: Sole sourcing contracts were 15–25% more expensive on average than similar competitive procurements.
- Political Influence: Contracts involving politically connected entities faced fewer consequences despite audit findings.
- Legitimate Sole Sourcing Cases: Emergency procurements and highly technical projects accounted for approximately 20% of analysed cases, demonstrating valid use of direct procurement.
Recommendations
- Standardise Justification Protocols: Mandate clear, documented reasons for all sole-sourced contracts.
- Empower VFM Auditors: Ensure audit recommendations are binding or supported by enforcement mechanisms.
- Enhance Transparency: Publicly disclose sole sourcing contracts, audit findings, and corrective actions to increase accountability.
- Strengthen Procurement Training: Provide ethics and compliance training for procurement officers and government officials.
- Implement Continuous Oversight: Regular independent follow-up audits to verify implementation of corrective actions.
Conclusion
Sole sourcing contracts are neither inherently corrupt nor universally efficient. While they serve practical and technical purposes, their misuse can result in financial inefficiency and diminished public trust.
Value-for-money audits are essential in distinguishing legitimate procurement from potential misconduct, but political influence can undermine their effectiveness.
By implementing rigorous justification procedures, increasing audit independence, and enhancing transparency, governments can harness the benefits of sole sourcing while minimising risks.
References (APA Style)
Ameyaw, C., Mensah, S., & Osei-Tutu, E. (2012). Public procurement in Ghana: The implementation challenges to the public procurement law. International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, 5(3), 460–483. https://doi.org/10.1108/17538371211230040
Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. University of California Press.
Søreide, T. (2002). Corruption in public procurement: Causes, consequences, and cures. Transparency International.
Thai, K. V. (2001). Public procurement re-examined. Journal of Public Procurement, 1(1), 9–50.
Walker, R. M., & Jones, R. (2012). Performance management in public sector organisations: The role of audits and evaluations. Public Administration Review, 72(1), 46–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02532.x
By Albert Atsu Sosu, CA, CFE, ACIB, PhD CANDI
