For decades, official development assistance has been a central pillar of financing in sub-Saharan Africa. That pillar is now weakening—quickly and broadly.
In 2025, bilateral aid to the region fell sharply, with early estimates pointing to cuts of about 26 per cent in a single year. Multilateral support is also under pressure, with major institutions projecting sizeable budget reductions. More cuts may follow as donors reset priorities in a shifting geopolitical environment.
As we explain in chapter 2 of the IMF’s recent Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, this is not a routine fluctuation. It is hitting countries that have limited room to adjust and few alternative sources of financing.
Why aid matters
Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest aid dependency globally in 2024. On average, aid accounted for 3 per cent of GDP at the regional level. But that average hid sharp differences. In low-income countries and fragile states, aid often reached 6 per cent of GDP or more, and in some cases far higher.
Over half of that aid was used to finance essential services such as health, education, and humanitarian assistance. And because development partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often deliver services directly to people in need, aid cuts can also curtail the very systems that people rely on. Effective responses to crises such as the Ebola emergency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the high and rising needs of people forcibly displaced by conflict, and the ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa rely heavily on the health and humanitarian infrastructure that aid has consistently helped to build.
A different reality
Aid flows have always fluctuated. But this episode stands apart.
The recent cuts are large and broadly simultaneous across countries. They are driven by donor decisions rather than changes in recipient economies. And they come at a time when traditional buffers are weaker: multilateral institutions and NGOs, which have often cushioned past declines, are themselves facing funding constraints. While non-traditional donors, such as China and the Gulf States, have grown their aid presence in the region, the magnitudes are not able to cover the reduction in traditional donors.
The cuts are also difficult to manage because they follow six years of successive shocks—including the pandemic, tighter global financial conditions, and food and energy crises—that have already eroded fiscal space.
Tough trade-offs
Governments now face difficult choices. Many have limited fiscal space, rising debt, and low reserves.
IMF-administered surveys covering 28 African countries suggest four broad policy responses:
- Some governments are not replacing lost aid, allowing programs to lapse. This limits immediate fiscal strain but carries high social costs.
- Many are reprioritizing spending, often cutting public investment—easier politically, but damaging to future growth.
- Others are borrowing more, including domestically, increasing debt risks.
- Some are stepping up revenue mobilization, though results take time.
Each option comes with trade-offs. Replacing lost aid can protect services and growth, but at the cost of wider deficits and external imbalances. Not replacing it stabilizes budgets and protects debt sustainability, but risks lasting damage to human capital and development.
There are no easy choices.
How to respond
The policy challenge is to manage the adjustment while preserving core development gains. Three priorities stand out.
First, protect and target high-impact aid.
With resources scarce, allocation matters more. Aid should be directed toward the countries and sectors where it has the greatest effect—especially low-income countries and fragile states, and essential humanitarian needs. Stronger coordination can reduce fragmentation and avoid duplication.
Second, broaden the financing toolkit.
Grant financing will remain essential, particularly in humanitarian contexts. But other instruments can play a larger role. Blended finance—using public funds to mobilize private investment—can help expand financing for infrastructure, energy, and agriculture. It is not a substitute for aid: it is harder to scale, more complex, and can add to debt if poorly designed. Managing these trade-offs will be critical.
Third, strengthen domestic capacity.
With aid less predictable, resilience increasingly depends on domestic institutions. This means mobilizing more revenue, improving spending efficiency, and strengthening policy design and service delivery. Aid has often provided both funding and implementation; replacing that capacity will take time and sustained investment.
A turning point
The shift that began in 2025 is unlikely to be temporary. It reflects a broader reconfiguration of development finance, shaped by tighter donor budgets and changing priorities.
The implications will vary by country, depending on exposure, initial buffers, and policy choices. But the direction is clear: reliance on external aid will become more uncertain, and domestic policy will matter more.
The immediate task is to manage the decline in aid without backsliding on the significant human development achievements of the past decades. The longer-term challenge is to adapt to a world where aid is less abundant and less predictable. How countries navigate both will shape growth and development outcomes for years to come.
By Chie Aoyagi, Maurizio Leonardi, Athene Laws, and Hamza Mighri
Chie Aoyagi, Maurizio Leonardi, and Athene Laws are economists in the IMF’s African Department, where Hamza Mighri is a research analyst.
