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Exiting the IMF Programme: Consider a PSI Instead

Seth Terkper, Former Minister of Finance

The ongoing discussions about the next steps after ending the current Extended Credit Facility (ECF) programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is very important.

Last year, I was privy to informal discussions at high levels on the matter—within the context of the impending Fourth Review of the ECF Programme and Article IV Consultations in 2017.

As with even advanced states such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal, discussions involving relations with the fund are never easy, as I am sure  President  Akufo-Addo and his Cabinet did in arriving at the decision to exit.

My long-standing view is to seriously consider the IMF’s alternative Policy Support Instrument (PSI), not exit completely in April or end 2018.

The fund says PSI “offers low-income countries that do not want — or need—Fund’s  financial assistance, a flexible tool that enables them to secure advice and support without a borrowing arrangement.”

The key words are financial assistance and, with good policies, the oil/gas era may make this unnecessary.

The IMF notes further: “This non-financial [PSI] instrument is a valuable complement to the lending facilities under the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF). The PSI helps countries design effective economic programmes that deliver clear signals to donors, multilateral development banks and markets of the fund’s endorsement of the strength of a member’s policies”.

‘Home-grown’ policy territory again?

The extreme salivating position is for Ghana to ‘go it alone’ without an IMF programme and, by implication, other multilateral economic policy cover—notably, no complementary World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) support. We are reminded of the launch of the “Home Grown” Policy initiative in 2013 and why we changed course to the current IMF programme.

The primary reason in opting for an IMF programme by mid-2014 was the fund’s reluctance to even have background discussions for an alternative PSI programme.
This was surprising and seemed harsh since other African countries such as Rwanda, Senegal, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Uganda already had this IMF arrangement.

For example, Uganda is currently on the eighth review of a second Fund PSI arrangement.

The fund’s  programme was also inevitable, given dwindling AfDB, World Bank and other multilateral support, which led to a freeze of budget funding from them and bilateral donors; and deteriorating signals to capital markets.

At the time, Ghana had re-entered the markets to raise funds to resolve its refinancing needs, especially to deal with roll-over risks associated with maturing Treasury Bills and Ghana’s first 2007 sovereign bond.

We note that the AfDB and World Bank also insisted on an IMF programme after providing technical assistance to prepare the 2013 ‘Home Grown’ Policy.

There is a useful lesson in international economic relations. In formulating programmes and policies, developing states do not deal with the IMF in isolation. In fact, a Greece watch shows that even the EU does not ignore the IMF in some cases.

It begs the question why a conversation now should revert to the PSI option. Among others, ownership matters: Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda seem to have more successful PSI Programmes—and relations with the IMF—than Ghana’s ECF, which also had the ‘Home Grown’ Policy as basis for the negotiations.

Why consider PSI

In addition to ‘adjustment fatigue’ and ‘ownership’ noted above, the factors that favour a PSI arrangement for Ghana include:

The Board will issue a report on the health and direction of economic policies and performance. This is done for ALL Fund member-states: developed, emerging and developing.

To reiterate, all negotiations, reviews and consultations with the IMF are difficult.

In Ghana’s case, faced with Jubilee FPSO breakdown and fall in crude oil price in 2015—even Cabinet and Parliament voluntarily reviewed the 2015 and 2016 Budgets—we were confronted with Fund embargoes under the ECF Programne. These include budget space for core 2016 Election expenses; guarantees and loans for investments in oil and gas projects; and opposition to the World Bank Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG)—the anchor for ongoing TEN/SANKOFA private and public investments (including expansion of the Atuabo plant/pipelines).

Earlier vetoes include bridge-financing (8.5 per cent) on better terms than the 10.75 per cent for the 2015 sovereign bond and insistence on zero-financing by Bank of Ghana in an economy that lacks a deep capital market.

Conclusion

Ghana is at a policy crossroads but with bright prospects for the economy from past policies and investments.

However, we have long-standing policy slippages and fast-changing global environment to contend with.

Hopefully, the mid-Year Review will offer clear policy options for the nation to move forward.

A mid-road or transitional step, such as an IMF PSI, appears best until we are on firm grounds. Despite past difficulties—and current frustrations with ‘creating fiscal space’ to fulfil electoral promises —the IMF has been right on many occasions.

These are some reasons why Ghana must exercise extreme caution in disengaging completely from the IMF.

By: Seth E. Terkper, Former Finance Minister, Ghana

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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